They said experience is the best teacher, so as history teaches the citizen about what has happened in the time past. Nigeria history cannot go down well without talking about some boiling issues, amongst which is Biafran Civil war.
The Nigerian Civil War was fought to reintegrate and reunify the
country. This paper will focus on the causes of the war, strategies
employed by the belligerents in the conflict, and the lessons learnt.
INTRODUCTION
The Federation of Nigeria, as it is known today, has never really been
one homogeneous country, for it's widely differing peoples and tribes.
This obvious fact notwithstanding, the former colonial master decided to
keep the country one in order to effectively control her vital resources
for their economic interests.
Thus, for administrative convenience the
Northern and Southern Nigeria were amalgamated in 1914. Thereafter
the only thing this people had in common was the name of their country
since each side had different administrative set - up.This alone was an
insufficient basis for true unity. Under normal circumstances the
amagalmation ought to have brought the various peoples together and
provided a firm basis for the arduous task of establishing closer cultural,
social, religious, and linguistic ties vital for true unity among the people.
There was division, hatred, unhealthy rivalry, and pronounced disparity
in development.
The growth of nationalism in the society and the subsequent
emergence of political parties were based on ethnic/tribal rather than
national interests, and therefore had no unifying effect on the peoples
against the colonial master. Rather, it was the people themselves who
were the victims of the political struggles which were supposed to be
aimed at removing foreign domination. At independence Nigeria became
a Federation and remained one country. Soon afterwards the battle to
consolidate the legacy of political and military dominance of a section of
Nigeria over the rest of the Federation began with increased intensity. It
is this struggle that eventually degenerated into coup, counter coup and
a bloody civil war.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Nigerian Civil War broke out on 6 July 1967. The war was the
culmination of an uneasy peace and stability that had plagued the Nation
from independence in 1960. This situation had its genesis in the
geography, history, culture and demography of Nigeria.
The immediate cause of the civil war itself may be identified as the
coup and the counter coup of 1966 which altered the political equation
and destroyed the fragile trust existing among the major ethnic groups.
As a means of holding the country together in the last result, the country
was divided into twelve states from the original four regions in May
1967. The former Eastern Region under Lt. Col. Ojukwu saw the act of
the creation of states by decree "without consultation" as the last straw,
and declared the Region an independent state of "Biafra". The Federal
Government in Lagos saw this as an act of secession and illegal. Several
meetings were held to resolve the issue peacefully without success. To
avoid disintegration of the country, the central government was left with
only one choice of bringing back the Region to the main fold by force.
The Federal side expected a quick victory while the Biafrans saw the
war as that of survival and were ready to fight to the last man. By August
1967, the war had been extended to the Mid - Western Region by the
Biafrans with the aim to relief pressure on the northern front and to
threaten the Federal Capital, Lagos. Both sides employed Political,
Diplomatic, Psychological and Military strategies to prosecute the war.
By the end of April 1969, after almost two years of bloody and
destructive war, the envisioned quick victory had eluded the Federal side,
the rebel enclave had been drastically reduced in size but the Biafrans
were still holding on. More peace conferences were held but none
achieved a cease - fire and an end to the war. The Federals embarked on
a strategic envelopment of the remaining Biafran enclave. By the
Christmas of 1969, it was obvious that the end of the civil war was near.
The self - acclaimed Head of State of Biafra, Lt. Col. Ojukwu, realizing
the hopelessness of the situation fled the enclave with his immediate
family members on the 10th of January 1970. The Commander of the
Biafran Army who took over the administration of the remaining enclave
surrendered to the Federal Government on 14th January 1970 bringing
an end to the war, secessionist attempt and bloodshed.
Several lessons were learnt from the war and these have helped in
the unification, political, military and economical progress of the country.
THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR CAUSES, STRATEGIES AND LESSONS
LEARNT
The Nigerian civil war, popularly known all over the world as the
"Biafran War" was fought from 2 July 1967 to 15 January 1970. The
war was between the then Eastern Region of Nigeria and the rest of the
country. The Eastern Region declared itself an independent state which
was regarded as an act of secession by the Federal Military Government
of Nigeria. The war was fought to reunify the country. In order to
understand what led to the civil war, it is necessary to give a brief
background history of Nigeria.
BACKGROUND HISTORY OF NIGERIA
The land mass known today as Nigeria existed as a number of
independent and sometimes hostile national states with linguistic and
cultural differences until 1900. The Governor General of Nigeria
between 1920 - 31 , Sir Hugh Clifford, described Nigeria as "a collection
of independent Native States, separated from one another by great
distances, by differences of history and traditions and by ethnological,
racial, tribal, political, social and religious barriers." (Nigeria Council
Debate. Lagos, 1920). The building of Nigeria as a multi - national
state began in 1900 with the creation of Northern and Southern
Protectorates along with the colony of Lagos by the British government.
Further effort at unification and integration was made in May 1906 when
the colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, which had
existed separately, were amalgamated to become the Colony and
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.
Even then the Northern and the Southern Administration were
separate and distinct. Both were independent of one another and each
was directly responsible to the Colonial Office. The first momentous act
of the British in the political evolution of Nigeria as a modern state was
the amalgamation of the administration of the two sections of Nigeria on
1 January 1914 by Lord Lugard. For ease of governing and in the
economic interest of the British, indirect rule and separate development
policy were maintained in the two sections of the country, with the
amalgamated administration based in Lagos. This, in effect produced
two Nigerias, each with different social, political, economic, and cultural
backgrounds and development within the country.
No further constitutional development took place until 1922. The
1922 constitution made provision, for the first time, for elected
members to sit on a Nigerian legislative council, but did not empower
them to make laws for the North. Nigeria was divided into four
administrative units in 1940; the colony of Lagos, the Northern, Eastern
and Western provinces. This administrative divisions, with increased
power for the colony and the provinces, was not only maintained but
separateness was also strengthened and deepened by Sir Arthur
Richardson's constitution of 1946 which inaugurated Nigeria's
regionalism. It however achieved a half - hearted political breakthrough
by integrating the North with the South at the legislative level for the
first time.
The post second World War political awareness and upsurge of
nationalism in Africa brought about the Richardson's constitution of
1950. Political parties were formed on regional and ethnic basis. The
outcome of this was obvious: full scale regionalism. With the
Macpherson's constitution of 1951, a greater measure of autonomy was
granted the regions with stronger regional legislatures. With only
residual power left to the central government, Nigeria politically took a
turn for the worse, and there was a possibility of three countries
emerging out of Nigeria.
In 1953, the central cabinet was split over the acceptance of a
target date for securing self - government with the end result of the Kano
riot. The gap between the regions widened. For the first time the North
talked openly of the possibility of secession rather than endure what
they saw as humiliation and ill - treatment. The West also threatened to
secede over the non - inclusion of Lagos in the West in the new
constitution. The 1954 constitution confirmed and formalized the
wishes of Nigerian leaders to move and remain as far apart as they
possibly could. The choice between Unitary and Federal options in the
form of government had been irrevocably made. The leaders settled for
Federal option. Thereafter things happened fast in the political arena.
There were constitutional conferences in 1957, 1958, 1959 and in 1960
culminating in the granting of independence to Nigeria on October 1,
1960.
It should be noted that from 1954 onwards, the political direction
was constantly away from a strong center towards a formidable, almost
insulation of the regional base of each major political party. The failure
of the Willink commission to recommend the creation of more states in
1958 for the Nigerian type of federalism planted the most potent seed of
instability into the evolution of Nigeria as a nation in the 1950s. All the
political leaders who had strong and firm political bases in the regions
fought hard for maximum powers for the regions which weakened the
center. At the same time, the ugly embers of tribalism and sectionalism
had been fanned into a deadly flame by all the political leaders. These
leaders rode on the crest of this cancerous tribalism and ignorance of
the people to power, at the expense of national unity and the nation.
Instead of regionalism ensuring and preserving national unity, it
became its bane. There were diffusion instead of fusion of the three
units. According to Gen. Obasanjo: "The only point on which Nigerian
political leaders spoke with one voice was the granting by the British of
political independence - and even then they did not agree on the
timing." (5:3) With granting of independence in 1960, all the dirt,
swept under the carpet, surfaced. Nigeria was now beset by strings of
political problems which stemmed from the lop-sided nature of the
political divisions of the country and the type of the existing federal
constitution, and the spirit in which it operated.
The first post independence disturbance was over the defense
agreement between Great Britain and Nigeria, which was seen as "an
attempt (by Britain) to swindle Nigeria out of her sovereignty", by
contracting with Nigeria to afford each other such assistance as may be
necessary for mutual defense and to consult together on measures to be
taken jointly or separately to ensure the fullest cooperation between
them for this purpose. It was viewed an unequal treaty. Through
student demonstrations and vehement opposition by the general public
and members of the Federal House of Representatives, the agreement
was abrogated in December 1962.
This episode was nothing compared with later developments in the
country's turbulent political history. The general census conducted in
1962 was alleged to be riddled with malpractices and inflation of figures
of such astronomical proportions that the Eastern Region refused to
accept the result. A second census was carried out in 1963, and even
then the figures were accepted with some reservations. Meanwhile the
people of the Middle Belt area of the North had grown increasingly
intolerant of the NPC rule of the North. The Tiv, one of the major tribes
in the Middle Belt, openly rioted for almost three years (1962 - 1965).
Then came the biggest crisis of them all - the general election of 1964.
The election was alleged to be neither free nor fair. All devices
imaginable were said to have been used by the ruling parties in the
regions to eliminate opponents.
The Chairman of the Electoral Commission himself admitted there
were proven irregularities. The President, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe refused to
appoint a Prime Minister in the light of these allegations. The President
and the incumbent Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, were
each seeking the support of the Armed Forces. This marked the first
involvement of the Armed Forces in partisan politics. For four anxious
days, the nation waited until the President announced that he had
appointed the incumbent Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, to
form a broad based government. The same could not be said of the
Western Region election of 1965. The rigging and irregularities in the
election were alleged to be more brazen and more shameful. Law and
order broke down completely leading to an almost complete state of
anarchy. Arson and indiscriminate killings were committed by a private
army of thugs of political parties. Law abiding citizens lived in constant
fear of their lives and properties.
This was the state of affairs when the coup of 15 January 1966 took
place. "As an immediate cause, it might be claimed that the explosion
of that day could be traced back along the powder trail to the fuse lit at
the time of the Western Region election of October 1965." (5:6) The
aim of the coup was to establish a strong, unified and prosperous nation,
free from corruption and internal strife. The outcome of the half-hearted
and ill-fated coup was a change of political balance in the country. Major
Nzeogwu's (the leader of the coup) aims for the coup was not borne out
of its method, style and results. All the politicians and senior military
officers killed were from the North and Western Region except a political
leader and a senior Army officer from the Mid - West and the East
respectively.
The coup hastened the collapse of Nigeria. "The Federation was sick
at birth and by January 1966, the sick, bedridden babe collapsed."
(1:210) From independence to January 1966, the country had been in a
serious turmoil; but the coup put her in an even greater situation. Most
of the coup planners were of Eastern origin, thus the Northerners in
particular saw it as a deliberate plan to eliminate the political heavy
weights in the North in order to pave way for the Easterners to take over
the leadership role from them. The sky high praises of the coup and
apparent relief given by it in the south came to a sudden end when the
succeeding Military Government of Maj Gen. J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi, an
Easterner, unfolded its plans. If Ironsi had displayed a greater sensitivity
to the thinking of the Northerners, he could have capitalized on the relief
that immediately followed the coup.
But in addition to his failure to take advantage of the initial
favorable reaction to the coup, he did not know what to do with the ring
leaders who had been arrested. He did not know whether to treat them
as heroes of the revolution or send them before a court martial as
mutineers and murderers. Military Governors were appointed to oversee
the administration of the regions. In the North the numbed favorable
reaction in certain quarters turned to studied silence and a "wait and
see" attitude. This gradually changed to resentment, culminating in the
May 1966 riots throughout the North during which most Easterners
residing in the North were attacked and killed.
A counter coup was staged by the Northern military officers on 29
July 1966 with two aims: revenge on the East, and a break up of the
country. But the wise counsel of dedicated Nigerians, interested and
well-disposed foreigners prevailed. The Head of State, Maj. Gen Aguiyi
Ironsi and many other senior officers of Eastern origin were killed. After
three anxious days of fear, doubts and non-government, Lt. Col. Yakubu
Gowon, at the time the most senior officer of Northern origin and then
the Chief of Staff, Nigerian Army, emerged as the new Nigerian political
leader. The lack of planning and the revengeful intentions of the second
coup manifested itself in the chaos, confusion and the scale of
unnecessary killings of the Easterners throughout the country. Even the
authors of the coup could not stem the general lawlessness and disorder,
the senseless looting and killing which spread through the North like wild
fire on 29 September 1966.
Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, the then Head of State, in a broadcast to the
people of the North in September said; "I receive complaints daily that
up till now Easterners living in the North are being killed and molested
and their property looted. It appears that it is going beyond reason and
is now at a point of recklessness and irresponsibility." (3:9) Before then,
in an effort to stop the killings and to preserve the nation in one form or
the other, an ad hoc conference of the representatives of the regions was
called on 9 August 1966 in Lagos. The meeting made the following
recommendations:
1. Immediate steps should be taken to post military personnel to
barracks within their respective regions of origin.
2. A meeting of this committee or an enlarged body should take
place to recommend in a broad outline the form of political
association which the country should adopt in the future
3. Immediate steps should be taken to nullify or modify any
provisions of any decree which assumes extreme centralization.
4. The Supreme Commander should make conditions suitable
for a meeting of the Supreme Military Council urgently as a further
means of lowering tension.
The first recommendation was implemented on 13 August 1966.
Troops of Eastern Nigeria origin serving elsewhere in the country were
officially and formally released and posted to Enugu, the capital of
Eastern Region, while troops of non-Eastern origin in Enugu moved to
Kaduna and Lagos. This marked the beginning of division and disunity
within the rank and file of the Nigerian Armed Forces. "This simple and
seemingly innocuous action broke the last thread and split the last
institution symbolizing Nigeria's nationhood and cohesion which had
been regularly tampered with by the politicians since 1962. The rift
between the Eastern Region and the rest of the country was total."
(5:8) Most of the civilian of Eastern Region origin who had never lived
in the East and would have continued to live elsewhere in the country
lost confidence and moved to the East. Some of them when they arrived
at their destination became refugees in their own country
None of the other recommendations was fully implemented except
nullification of the unification decree. The implementation of the
recommendation with regards to the posting of troops to barracks within
their region of origin was relentlessly pursued by the political leaders of
Western Region after the exercise had been completed in the Eastern
Region. They were afraid of the so - alled Northern troops domination
and probably of the safety of the troops of Western Region origin.
With the troops of Eastern Region back in Enugu and the
non-Eastern troops withdrawn from there, with Nigerians of non-Eastern
origin driven out of the East in their own interest, and with Easterners at
home and abroad returning home with news of Nigerian's brutality
against them, and with the oil flowing in the Eastern Region, the way was
now open for the implementation of the secession. The East and the
North began a virulent of words through their radios and newspapers.
Early in 1967, a peace negotiating meeting of the Supreme Military
Council of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Eastern Region
Military Governor, Lt. Col. Ojukwu was called under the auspices of Gen.
Ankrah of Ghana in Aburi, Ghana. As it turned out, all the other
members of the council except Ojukwu were either too thrusting, too
naive or too ill - prepared for the meeting. Therefore Ojukwu scored a
vital goal in his ambition.
Walter Schwarz remarked : "Ojukwu got his way with little effort, by
being the cleverest. He was the only one who understood the issue. Step
by step the others came to acquiesce in the logic of Ojukwu's basic
thesis - that to stay together at all, the regions had first to draw apart.
Only Ojukwu understood that this meant, in effect, a sovereign Biafra
(Eastern Region) and the end of the Federation." (6:18) Different
versions of what happened in Aburi were released by Ojukwu in the East
and by the Federal Military Government in Lagos. Ojukwu accused the
Federal Government of bad faith and going back on promises. The
Federal Government accused Ojukwu of distortion and half truths. After
several meetings amongst the Federal and Regional officials, what
amounted to the demise of the Federation was promulgated in decree
No. 8 of 17 March 1967 in a desperate effort to implement the Aburi
decisions and to avoid further stalemate and possible civil war. Not
surprisingly, Ojukwu completely rejected Decree No. 8 as falling short of
full implementation of Aburi decisions. The die was cast. All efforts to
intervene by eminent Nigerians and well - wishers to Nigeria like Gen.
Ankrah, late Emperor Hallie Selassie of Ethiopia and the late Dr Martin
Luther King proved abortive.
The flurry of conciliatory meetings achieved nothing. Gen. Obasanjo
remarked: "Ojukwu was adamant, obstinate and obdurate. He refused to
attend the Supreme Military Government meeting called in March in
Benin city, Nigeria to discuss outstanding issues and deliberate on the
budget for the coming fiscal year. If he could not achieve his long
cherished ambition of ruling an independent Nigeria, he could break it up
and rule an independent and sovereign "Biafra." Nothing could stop
him." (5:10) As early as 7 June 1966, after the May incident in the North,
Ojukwu was quoted as saying: We are finished with the Federation. It is
all a question of time." (5:11)
Ojukwu seized the Federal Government property and funds in the
East. He planned the hijacking of a National commercial aircraft Fokker
27 on a schedule flight from Benin to Lagos. All these and other signs
and reports convinced the Federal Military Government of Ojukwu's
intention to secede. Lt Col. Yakubu Gowon, the Head of Federal
Government, imposed a total blockade of the East. It was realized that
more stringent action had to be taken to weaken support for Ojukwu and
to forestall his secession bid. Short of military action at that time,
creation of States by decree was the only weapon ready to hand. The
initial plan was to create States in the Eastern Region only. Such action
was considered impolitic and fraught with danger. Eventually 12 States
were created throughout the country on 27 May 1967.
The Eastern Region was divided into three states. The reaction from
Enugu was sharp and quick: the declaration of Eastern Nigeria as the
independent sovereign state of "Biafra" on 30 May 1967. The month of
June was used by both sides to prepare for war. Each side increased its
military arsenal and moved troops to the border watching and waiting
until the crack of the first bullet at the dawn of 6 July 1967 from the
Federal side. The war had started and the dawn of a new history of
Nigeria.
HISTORY OF THE NIGERIAN ARMY BEFORE 1966
What is known today as the Nigerian Army was, before 1966, a part
of the British West African Army called the Royal West Africa Frontier
Force ( RWAFF ). This force included the armies of Gold Coast (Ghana)
Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Gambia. At this time, there were eight
indigenous Nigerian officers in the entire force, the rest being British
officers. The role of an army in a developing country was not fully
realized by the nationalist leaders struggling for independence, hence,
there was no effective pressure on the British Government to train
Nigerian officers in preparation for independence. Even at this stage, it
was clear that the future stability of a nation such as Nigeria depended
to a large scale on the existence of a reliable army. One result of this
short - sightedness was that the first Nigerian to command the Nigerian
Army - Maj Gen. J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi, was not appointed until 1965, nearly
five years after independence.
At independence, it was also obvious that only the group that
controlled the Army could aspire to run a stable Nigerian government.
Either by coincidence or by design, almost all the military installations
were concentrated in one area of the country - The North. To illustrate
this fact, below is a list of major military installations in Nigeria and their
locations before the January 1966 coup:
Northern Nigeria:
1. 3rd Bn Kaduna
2. 5th Bn Kano
3. 1 Field Battery (Arty) Kaduna
4. 1 Field Squadron (Engrs) Kaduna
5. 88 Transport Regt Kaduna
6. Nigerian Defense Academy "
7. Ordinance Depot "
8. 44 Military Hospital "
9. Nigeria Military Training College "
10. Recon Squadron & Regt "
11. Nigerian Air Force "
12. Ammunition Factory "
13. Recruit Training Depot Zaria
14. Nigerian Military School "
Western Nigeria:
1. 4th Bn Ibadan
2. 2 Field Battery (Arty) Abeokuta
3. 2 Recon Squaron "
Eastern Nigeria:
1st Bn Enugu
There were no military units in the Mid - Western Nigeria and those
in Lagos were either administrative or ceremonial. Recruitment of
soldiers into the Nigerian Army was based on ethnic quota system.
Under this system Northern Nigeria provided 60%, Eastern and Western
Nigeria 15% each and Mid - Western Nigeria 10%. This was done to
encourage the Northerners who had not been interested in joining the
Army initially. The standard of entry into the Army was as well lowered to
favor the Northerners. As a result the North in 1966 had the absolute
majority within the rank and file of the Army. The standards fell within
the Army and the soldiers became more politically conscious. Madiebo
pointed out "In order to ensure the loyalty of the military thus
established, the criterion for promotion and advancement was based
more on political considerations than efficiency or competence. (2:10)
The involvement of the Military in politics took a turn for the worse
during the Western Nigerian elections in October 1965. The politicians
openly courted the friendship of top military officers. Due to the chaos
that characterized the general election of 1964 and the Western Region
election of 1965, it had become clear that Nigeria was overdue for a
change. By October 1965, rumors of an impending coup were already
circulating in the country. It was therefore not much of a surprise when
the coup was finally staged.
THE WAR PLANNING STRATEGIES NIGERIA MOBILIZATION
The declaration of secession made war not inevitable but imminent.
At the dawn of 6 July 1967, the first bullet was fired signalling the
beginning of the gruesome 30 month civil war and carnage, brothers
killing brothers. Preparations for war had already been set in motion on
the Nigerian side by May 1967. All the soldiers of Northern, Western,
and Mid - Western origin had been withdrawn from the East and
redeployed. Four of the regular infantry battalions of the Army were
placed under the command of 1 Brigade and redesignated 1 Area
Command. Mobilization of ex - service men was ordered by the
Commander - in - Chief. Out of those called up, about seven thousand
in number, four other battalions were formed. Increased recruitment
from the personnel of the Nigerian Police Force was embarked upon.
The civilians were trained in civil defense duties. In mobilizing the
people of Nigeria, the Federal Government had to make the war look a
just cause to stop the disintegration of the country and in doing this a
slogan was invented "To keep Nigeria one is a task that must be done."
Even the letters of the Head of the Federal Government, GOWON was
coined to read "Go On With One Nigeria" and became a very strong
propaganda.
MILITARY
Delivery of arms and equipment for the Nigerian Army were
hastened. Nigerian Army Headquarters (NAHQ) Operations plan
envisaged a war that will be waged in four phases and that will be over
within a month with The four phases were
(1) Capture of Nsukka, (2) Capture of Ogoja, (3) Capture of Abakaliki,
(4) Capture of Enugu.
1 Area Command was to be the fighting force, 2 Area Command in
Ibadan, Western Region, was earmarked for the defense of Mid - West
and border protection while the Lagos Garrison Organization was
earmarked for the defense of Lagos, the Federal capital.
The NAHQ assessment of the rebels in terms of men under arms and
equipment did not give the NAHQ much concern. The total mobilization
and the will of the people of the Eastern Nigeria to fight against severe
odds was under estimated. Nigeria knew that the survival of Biafra
depended on importation of material from abroad to sustain her war
efforts and the only route was through the Atlantic Ocean. As part of
strategic planning, the Nigerian Navy (NN) was to blockade the region
from the sea thereby preventing shipment of arms, equipment, food and
other war materiel and services into the East. At the same time all flights
to the region were cancelled and the international community were
informed that no flight to the region would be accepted without
clearance from Lagos. The NAHQ did not pay any particular attention to
strategic intelligence of the Eastern Region. In planning and concept the
war was intended to be fought by the troops located in the North and to
be supplied mainly from Kaduna.
Immediately secession was declared, Nigeria sent her war ships to
blockade and secure all sea routes into the region. The Nigerian Air
Force was tasked to ensure the control of the air space over the entire
country. The offensive was to be a two prong attack, a combined arms
mechanized infantry divisional attack from the north and an amphibious
operation by another division from the south with the aim of crushing the
Biafran army in between. The offence was to be supported by the Air
Force and the Navy. A third and fourth fronts were introduced later in
the war.
DIPLOMATIC
At the Diplomatic level, the Federal Government mounted a serious
campaign to dissuade other countries, particularly the super powers, the
USA, USSR, and the United Kingdom from recognizing the secessionist.
The war was painted as an adventure by an individual. The government
in Lagos continued to represent the entire country in the international
organizations where a very strong propaganda was mounted to continue
to portray the war as one to re-unite the country. This made it possible
to win the support of the super powers and to continue to discredit
Biafra. Through this support, Nigeria was able to import more arms and
equipment from all over the world to prosecute the war. In order to show
that she was prepared for a peaceful solution to the conflict, Nigeria
continued to participate in peace talks organized by the international
community.
PSYCHOLOGICAL
Realizing the importance of the support of the civil populace, Nigeria
embarked on an elaborate psychological warfare. "To keep Nigeria one
is a task that must be done" became a very popular slogan. Leaflets
discrediting the Biafran Head of State, encouraging the Biafrans to lay
down their arms with a promise of non-persecution, were regularly
dropped in the East.
BIAFRA MILITARY
On the Biafran side, preparation for war was put into high gear as
soon as the troops of non - Eastern origin withdrew from Enugu in
August of 1966. Thousands of people poured in for recruitment.
Training was embarked upon both for officers and soldiers who were
mainly lecturers and university students. Before the outbreak of hostility,
the Eastern Region had no sufficient arms since all the soldiers who
returned to the region did so without their arms while the soldiers who
were withdrawn from the East departed with their weapons. What was
left of the Nigerian Army at Enugu barracks amounted to about 240
soldiers, the majority of them technicians and tradesmen and not all the
soldiers had weapons. However at the outbreak of the war, the Eastern
Region had succeeded in securing arms and ammunition from France,
Spain and Portugal. Madiebo remarked, "When more weapons were
received in May 1967, a decision was taken to form two new battalions
to be called the 9th and 14th Battalions." (2:100)
Many pilots and technicians formerly of the Nigerian Air Force of
Eastern origin returned to the region to form the Biafran Air Force (BAF).
Two old planes, a B26 and a B25 were acquired with new helicopters. T
he two bombers were fitted with machine guns and locally made rockets
and bombs. The BAF also acquired Minicon aircrafts. A small Navy was
established in Calabar with some patrol boat formerly used by the
Nigerian Navy. More boats were later manufactured locally and these
were armored plated and fitted with light guns and machine guns. A
peoples army called, the Biafra Militia, was formed. Local leaders and ex
- servicemen trained young men and women in the use of whatever
weapon the indivIduals had. These weapons were mainly imported and
locally made short guns. The militia were to provide a ready source of
manpower re-enforcement for the regular army, to assist with military
administration immediately behind the frontline, to garrison all the areas
captured or regained from the enemy, and to help educate the
population on the reason why Biafra was fighting.
An establishment known as the Administration Support was formed.
Before the declaration of hostility, the small Biafran Army was almost
completely administered and maintained by donations from the civil
populace. This establishment was to muster necessary support
particularly logistic requirements for the army and to run the
administration since all the young and able bodied men and women were
to be engaged in the fight. A Food Directorate, responsible for the
purchase and distribution of all food, drink and cigarettes to the armed
forces and the nation was formed. A Transport Directorate with
established. A Petroleum Management Board was established for
procurement, management and distribution of POL. The board designed
and built a sizeable and efficient fuel refinery which produced petrol,
diesel, and engine oil at considerably fast rate.
Several other directorates such as Clothing, Housing, Propaganda,
Requisition and Supply, and Medical were established. Clothing in
particular was very essential as uniform was unavailable in Biafra. The
textile mills in the Eastern Region were reactivated to produce bails of
uniform for the armed forces and the civilians. A Research and
Production Board was established. This organization researched and
manufactured rockets, mines, tanks, grenades, launchers, bombs,
flame throwers, vaccines, biological and alcoholic beverages and so
forth.
Women were not left out in the scheme of things. Women were
trained in intelligence gathering and how to infiltrate into the Nigerian
side. Women Voluntary Service was formed to assist in educating the
women of Biafra on the cause of the crisis, keep women informed of
developments, rehabilitation of war casualties, setting up of nurseries,
orphanages,civil defense corps, and provision of cooks for the troops.
An Advisory Committee was set up to plan and execute the war and to
advise the Head of State on political and military matters.
POLITICAL / DIPLOMATIC
The Biafrans knew that the odds against them was immense and that
their survival depended on the amount of external support they were
able to muster. The Biafrans, through many of their people abroad,
mounted a very strong campaign and propaganda for the recognition of
Biafra by the international community and for the purchase of arms and
equipment. This powerful propaganda paid off by her recognition by
countries like, Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Haiti, covert
support by France and double dealing by countries like West Germany,
Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, Republic of Dahomey, Sierra Leone
and secret importation of arms and ammunition into the region.
THE CLASH OF ARMS STRATEGIES EMPLOYED
Nigeria's potential in manpower, wealth, natural resources, land
mass, infrastructure, international links and diplomacy could hardly be
surpassed in Africa. Whenever war is declared, people are generally
concerned with the relative strengths of the opposing forces coupled
with their war potential. Armed forces are the towing equipment that
pulls a nation out if she runs aground in her policy. It is madness for a
nation to commit herself more than her armed forces can do. There was
no comparison between the strengths of the opposing forces in the
Nigerian civil war. Nigerian Army (NA) was too formidable for Biafra, a
ratio of 4:1. However each side knew the tactics the other side would
employ since they all belonged to the same Armed Forces before the war.
The Biafran Army, realizing the odds against them decided correctly
to go into defense. Taking the advantage of fighting on their own
ground, they constructed fortified pill boxes on the enemy most likely
avenues of approach, the major highways connecting the Eastern Region
with the rest of the country. The Biafran army had gathered a lot of
information on the disposition of the Nigerian army and made
contingency plans to meet any incursion into their territory. They
conducted training exercise code named "Exercise Checkmate" which
was on the line Biafra Army hoped to fight. This exoercise was so
realistic that when the Nigerian Army started their offensive, they
reacted exactly the way Biafra expected them to. Biafra deployed her
troops as follows:
1. Northern Sector - 51st Brigade made up of three infantry
Battalions
2.Central Zone and Garrison Command - 11th Infantry Battalion
3.Southern Zone - 52nd Brigade made up of three battalions.
The Biafran Air Force carried out strategic bombings of major towns,
military installations and the Defense Industry. This had a diverstating
effect on civilian population and further helped the Nigerian propaganda
which resulted in making more people to join the NA to crush the
rebellion. The Biafran Navy also carried out some attack on the Nigerian
ships with little effect. Mercenaries were hired to train the troops and
took part in the fighting.
THE NIGERIAN ARMY OFFENSIVE.
Nigeria opened her offensive operations from the northern sector. 1
Area Command NA, supported by an Artillery Brigade, Armored units
equipped with British Scorpion tanks, Saladin armored cars and ferrets,
and Engineer units, issued its operational orders for OPUNICORD, the
code name for the "police" action against the rebels on the 2 July
1967.The offence was launched on two fronts. The command was
divided into two brigades with three battalions each. 1 Brigade
advanced on the axis Ogugu - Ogunga - Nsukka road while 2nd Brigade
advanced on axis Gakem - Obudu - Ogoja road. The rebels successfully
repulsed the attack. However, with the many friends the command had
made since they concentrated on the border waiting for the order to
attack, they began to recruit guides, informants and with this came the
intelligence on the disposition of the Biafran troops, their strength and
plans and a breakthrough.
By the 10th of July 1967, 1st Bde had captured all its first objectives
and if they had had the detail intelligence of the Biafran army on this day
they would have pressed on to take Enugu, the Biafran capital. H.M.
Njoku remarked, "At Ukehe I could not believe my eyes. All along the
way were refugees streaming towards Enugu on Nsukka road. Many of
the retreating troops carried self inflicted wounds. Some senior offices
complained of malaria, headache, and all sorts of ailments. If the NA
knew the situation on the Biafran side on this eventful day and pressed
on they would have taken Enugu the same day without resistance."
(4:128)
By the 12th of July the 2nd Bde had captured Obudu, Gakem, and
Ogoja. A second front, the southern sector was opened on the 26 July,
1967 by a sea landing on Bonny by a division formed from the Lagos
Garrison Organization (LGO). With the support of the Navy, the division
established a beach head and exploited north after a fierce sea and land
battle. On 8th August 1967, Biafra invaded the former Mid - Western
Region with the aim to relieve the pressure on the northern sector and to
threaten Lagos, the Federal Capital. While the LGO was making
preparations for subsequent operations beyond Bonny, the news of the
rebel infiltration into the Mid - West was passed to the commander who
was then instructed to leave a battalion in Bonny, suspend all operations
there and move to Escravos with two battalions with a view to dislodging
the rebels and clearing the riverine area of the Mid - West. These moves
were carried out with the support of the Nigerian Navy and the
merchant of the National Shipping Line. Another division was formed to
support the LGO in the clearing of the Mid - West of the rebels. At this
point, the formations were redesignated 1 Area Command became 1
Infantry Division, the newly division was designated 2 Infantry Division,
and the LGO became the 3 Infantry Division. And with this the "police
action" turned into a full scale military operation.
By the end of September 1969, a substantial part of the Mid - West
had been cleared of the rebels. The commander of the 3 Infantry
Division secured permission to change the designation of his formation
to 3 Marine Commando because of the peculiarly riverine and creek
operations already carried out by the division. This was the first time
something in the resemblance of a Marine organization was tried in the
history of the Nigerian Army. The division was not trained In amphibious
operations. Infact the troops were made up of the soldiers of the Lagos
Garrison Organization (LGO), the administrative establishment for the
Federal capital. However, with some crash training, the division became
the most feared and successful throughout the war.
Enugu became the bastion of secession and rebellion and the
Federal Government of Nigeria expected that its capture would mean the
end of secession. The advance from Nsukka to Enugu began in earnest
on 12 September 1967. The rebels counterattacked and for the first
time launched their "Red Devil" tanks. These were modified pre - second
World War armored personnel carriers made in France. They were
dangerous, slow, blind, cumbersome and not easily maneuverable. T hey
were easy prey to anti - tank recoilless rifles and bold infantry attack. By
the 4th October 1967, Enugu was captured and with this capture 1
Infantry Division took time to refit and reorganize. The division had the
erroneous belief that the fall of Enugu would automatically mean the
collapse of the rebellIon. 1 Infantry Division decided to give the rebels
time to give up secession not knowing that the fire of rebellion was still
burning high in the hearts of most Easterners. Ojukwu was callously
fanning the fire and riding high on the emotions of his apparently
wounded and high spirited people who felt slighted and wanted to
revenge for all the events of 1966. It took the division another six
months to resume the offence thereby giving the rebels the necessary
respite to also reorganize and acquire more ammunition, weapons and
equipment to continue the resistance.
The 3 Marine Commando opened another front on the south / south
eastern border. With the support of the Navy, Calabar was captured on
the 13th October 1967. The capture of Calabar, Warri, Escravos and
Bonny established the supremacy of the Federal Government in Nigerian
waters and international waters bordering Nigerian coast. Biafra was
sealed off leaving Portharcourt Airport as the only means of international
communication and transportation with the outside world. It was at this
point that Biafran leadership decided to find alternative routes for
importation of war materiel and medical aids into the enclave. Three
stretches of straight roads were developed into airstrips; Awgu, Uga and
Ulli. On 19th May 1968 Portharcourt was captured. With the capture of
Enugu, Bonny, Calabar and Portharcourt, the outside world was left in no
doubt of the Federal supremacy in the war. The mercenaries fighting for
Biafra started deserting. Biafra started to smuggle abroad photographs
of starving children and to blackmail Nigeria of genocide. This
secured military, economic and political relief from international
organizations for Biafra and further lengthened the war and the suffering
of the people of Biafra.
By the early 1969, 2nd Infantry Division crossed the Niger River at
Idah, after several unsuccessful attempts to cross the river at Asaba,
advanced through the already liberated areas of Nsukka and Enugu to
capture Onitsha. The division continued its advance towards Owerri. At
the same time 1 Infantry Division advanced on Umuahia. The 3 Marine
Commando was by now advancing on three fronts: Oguta - Owerinta -
Ulli airstrip - Umuahia axis; Portharcourt - Aba - Owerri - Umuahia axis;
and Calabar - Uyo - Umuahia axis. The plan was a link up with 1 Infantry
Division at Umuahia in order to envelop the rebels and either force them
to surrender or to destroy their fighting spirit. his plan, the final
offensive, was successfully implemented. Biafra tried unsuccessfully to
hold the NA onslaught using guerrilla tactics.
On the 10th January 1970, Lt. Col. Ojukwu, the self proclaimed Head
of State of Biafra, on realizing the total chaotic and hopelessness of the
situation, handed over to the Commander Biafran Army Maj. Gen. Phillip
Effiong, the administration of Biafra and flew out of the enclave with his
immediate family members in search of peace. Maj. Gen. Effiong
consulted with the Biafra Strategic Committee on the situation and they
decided that enough was enough and that the only honorable way out
was to surrender. In his surrender announcement to the people of Biafra
on Radio Biafra, part of Maj. Gen. Effiong address said:
Fellow Countrymen,
As you know I was asked to be the officer administering the
government of this republIc on the 10th of January, 1970. Since then I
know some of you have been waiting to hear a statement from me.
Throughout history, injured people have had to result to arms in their self
defense where peaceful negotiation have failed. We are no exception. We
took up arms because of the sense of insecurity generated in our people
by the events of 1966. We have fought in defense of that cause. I am
now convinced that a stop must be put to the bloodshed which is going on
as a result of the war. I am also convinced that the suffering of our
people must be brought to an end. Our people are now disillusioned and
those elements of the old regime who have made negotiations and
reconciliation impossible have voluntarily removed themselves from our
midst. I have, therefore, instructed an orderly disengagement of troops.
I urge on Gen. Gowon, in the name of humanity, to order his troops
to pause while an armistice is negotiated in order to avoid the mass
suffering caused by the movement of population. We have always believed
that our differences with Nigeria should be settled by peaceful
negotiation. A delegation of our people is therefore ready to meet
representatives of Nigerian Government anywhere to negotiate a peace
settlement on the basis of OAU resolution.
Part of Maj. Gen. Yakubu Gowon, the Head of the Federal
Government's speech to accept formally the declared surrender and the
end of the civil war read:
Citizens of Nigeria,
It is with a heart full of gratitude to God that I announce to you that
today marks the formal end of the civil war. This afternoon at the
Doddan Barracks, Lt. Col. Phillip Effiong, Lt. Col. David Ogunewe, Lt. Col.
Patrick Anwunah, Lt. Col. Patrick Amadi and commissioner Police, Chief
Patrick Okeke formally proclaimed the end of the attempt at secession
and accepted the authority of the Federal Military Government of
Nigeria. They also formally accepted the present political and
administrative structure of the country. This ends thirty months of a
grim struggle. Thirty months of sacrifice and national agony.
The world knows how hard we strove to avoid the civil war. Our
objectives in fighting the war to crush Ojukwu's rebellion were always
clear. We desired to preserve the territorial integrity and unity of
Nigeria. For, as one country, we would be able to maintain lasting peace
amongst our various communities; achieve rapid economic development
to improve the lot of our people; guarantee a dignified future and respect
in the world for our posterity and contribute to African unity and
modernization. On the other hand, the small successor states in a
disintegrated Nigeria would be victims of perpetual war and misery and
neo - colonialism. Our duty was clear. And we are today, vindicated.
The so - called "Rising Sun of Biafra" is set for ever. It will be a great
disservice for anyone to continue to use the word "Biafra" to refer to any
part of the East Central State of Nigeria. The tragic chapter of violence
is just ended. We are at the dawn of national reconciliation. Once again
we have the opportunity to build a new nation. On our side, we fought
the war with great caution, not in anger or hatred, but always in the hope
that common sense would prevail. Many times we sought a negotiated
settlement, not out of wickedness, but in order to minimize the problems
of reintegration, reconciliation and reconstruction. We knew that
however the war ended, in the battlefield or in the conference room, our
brothers fighting under other colors must rejoin us and that we must
together rebuild the nation anew. All Nigerians share the victory today.
The victory for national unity, victory for hopes of Africans and black
people everywhere. We mourn the dead heroes. We thank God for
sparing us to see this glorious dawn of national reconciliation. We must
seek His guidance to do our duty to contribute our quota to the building
of a great nation, ounded on the concerted efforts of all its people and
on justice and equality. A nation never to return to the fractious, sterile
and selfish debates that led to the tragic conflict just ending.
The Federal Government has mounted a massive relief operations to
alleviate the suffering of the people in the newly liberated areas. We are
mobilizing adequate resources to provide food, shelter, and medicines for
the affected population. My government has directed that former civil
servants and public corporation officials should be promptly reinstated
as they come out of hiding. Details of this exercise have been published.
Plans for the rehabilitation of self - employed people will also be
announced promptly. We have overcome a lot over the past four years. I
have therefore every confidence that ours will become a great nation.
The surrender paper was signed on 14th January 1970 in Lagos and
thus came the end of the civil war and renunciation of secession.
LESSONS LEARNT
The Nigerian civil war, unlike other wars across international
boundaries, was a war of unification, a war of reintegration. It was
therefore a much more difficult war for the Federal field commanders to
prosecute with the objectives of unification in mind than wars fought
against aggressors on foreign land. The human aspect was paramount.
It was a contradiction and complication not easy to resolve - how to fight
causing only limited destruction, how to inflict wounds and heal at the
same time, how to subdue without fatal and permanent injuries, how to
feed and house civilian population without exposing our troops to
danger and risk of saboteurs and infiltrators, how to achieve surrender
without inflicting permanent or long lasting psychological humiliation.
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC
The Nigerian political tensions, conflicts and confrontations, like
other human interactions, had never conformed with the law of physics
that action and reaction are opposite and equal. Reactions had always
been more intense and graver than action, real or imagined. Those who
are the sowers of wind are usually the reapers of the whirlwind. The
Kano riots of 1953 was a reaction to the humiliation of the Northern
legislators in Lagos most of whom are still alive and politicking while the
rioters are dead, unsung and long forgotten. In the Nigerian historical
context, each political action, tension or conflict had evoked more
violence in reaction and the elites who initiated the action are normally
not the ones who reap the more violent reaction or destruction. They are
masters in the art of survival and they have always emerged almost
unscratched. It is the common man who knows little or nothing of the
on-goings and who certainly gains nothing from the appointments or the
prerequisites of office of these elites that is used as cannon fodder and
expendable material for the attainment and sustenance of power, wealth
and prosperity.
Our leaders aid those of other developing nations must eschew
bitterness and violence, learn that no individual or section has a
monopoly of violence and that one action of violence evokes greater and
more destructive violent reaction, the magnitude which can never be
imagined in advance. In the end the law of retributive justice catches
with the perpetrators of bitterness, violence and destruction. This
difficult lesson must be learnt.
The great publicity given to the war by Markpress on behalf of Biafra,
especially the photographs of starving children and ruined or deserted
towns, evoked deep feelings of sympathy all over the Western world. By
and large, these pitiful sights touched the conscience of those who
mounted large scale humanitarian campaigns on behalf of Biafra. The
issues in the war were relegated to the background and the human and
humanitarian aspects came to the fore. Most of them were genuine in
their humanitarian efforts but little did they know that most of their
contributions were used to purchase arms and ammunition which
prolonged the war and thereby increased and heightened the sufferings
of those they were trying to help.
There were involvement of some notable world leaders on
supposedly humanitarian grounds, but they had, as we have seen,
ulterior motives which were mainly to satisfy their political, economic or
diplomatic interests. Some foreign governments covertly encouraged
and sustained rebellion under the guise of humanitarianism by secretly
giving weapons and other war material to Biafra. They seceded in
fuelling the war and prolonged it and consequently prolonging the
suffering of the people in the war affected areas.
The importance of winning the support and mobilizing the civilian
populace became very obvious. Biafra, despite her inferiority in
manpower and war machineries held on for so long because her people
believed in fighting the war which they considered a war of survival. On
the same token, Nigeria won the war primarily because she was able to
win the support of the populace who enlisted in thousands to reunify the
country.
MILITARY
Moral and discipline are two of the most important factors that
greatly contribute to success in war. Obasanjo commented on the
effects of these factors thus, "I observed amongst Nigerian troops
during the war different aspects of human behavior under the stress and
strains of battle, and interaction between ordinary Nigerians, war or no
war. What I found amazing was the length to which soldiers would go
when morale and discipline broke down, in order to avoid going to battle
or, so to speak, facing death. In effect, while running away from death
they inflicted death on themselves as some of them died from their self -
inflicted injuries. But towards the end of the war when everything was
going right - the rebels were on the run, advance was fast and
co-ordinated, moral was high - even our own wounded soldiers did not
want to be evacuated to the rear for treatment and medical attention.
Several times I heard such wounded soldiers saying to me, "Oga, na you
and me go end this war and capture Ojukwu. " (5:169)
Motivation is another very important factor that made troops fight.
The Nigerian soldiers enjoyed rapid promotion and increase in pay
throughout the war. This encouraged them to fight on. It is also
important to allow troops time to worship in their various religious faith.
Chaplains should be provided to pray for the troops whenever time
warrants. War is a situation that requires faith - faith in your equipment,
faith in your comrades and colleagues, faith in God or the supreme being
or whatever one believes in, faith in oneself and in the cause for which
one is fighting. I believe that success in a profession that embraces the
twin problem of human relationships and personal danger in a degree
not to be found in any other profession demands more than the
attributes of man, it requires divine guidance as well. The care for the
wounded and the dead must be taken seriously.
High standard of training can never be over emphasized. Most of
the soldiers recruited during the war did not undergo enough depot
training before being launched into battle. This resulted in many
casualties on both sides. Most of them who survived the war had to be
retrained. Members of the military must recognize that they depend
more on the professional and technical competence and proficiency of
their team members than on the formal authority structure. The
maintenance of the highly sophisticated weapons and equipment
procured during the war became very difficult. Most of them lasted for a
few months in combat. Weapons were imported from all over the world
and this led to non - standardization after the war. Most of them had to
be phased out due to lack of spare parts. The quality of initiative in
the individual must be allowed to develop. It is the most valued of all
leadership qualities and virtues in the military. In this period of
tremedious technological change, military leaders are confronted with
almost perpetual change or crisis of organization especially in a fairly
fluid combat situation. Whatever may be the technological achievement
of our age and it's impact on military science, improvisation is still the
keynote of the individual fighter and combat group. This aspect of
military training must be emphasized in peacetime. This is particularly
important in the developing nation like ours.
Failures arising from lack of adequate joint training became very
obvious as a result of fratricide that occurred during the war. On many
occasions fire support request made to the Air Force never came, and
when it did come, it was sometimes on own friendly positions. Supply
from the air that became necessary atimes and were tried often fell on
the enemy side.
It is commonly said that an army fights on its stomach. Logistics
won the war for Nigeria. If the Biafrans had half of the resources Nigeria
had, the story might be different. The Biafrans were better organized
and managed the meager resources available to them more effectively.
The Nigerian Army learnt a big lesson from this. The Army school of
Logistics was upgraded and well funded to train and produce high
quality logisticians for the Army after the war.
Communication in the field was a big problem to both sides in the
conflict. Radios were lacking and when they were procured, trained
manpower was not available. The importance of good and reliable
communication and gathering of adequate and up to date intelligence of
the enemy was a big lesson.
The silencing of guns allowed the milk of brotherhood, love,
understanding and sympathy to flow from both the civilians and the
soldiers on the Federal side to their fellow citizens on the rebel side. As
time went by, everybody came to appreciate the futility of the war which
some had regarded as inevitable.
CONCLUSION
The war had come and gone. The story of the war and what led to it
has been told, is being told and will continue to be told. What seems to
me a human tragedy all through ages is the inability of man to learn a
good lesson from the past so as to avoid the pitfall of those who had
gone before. There is also the innate and unconscious desire of man to
remain oblivious of the lessons of the past. He hopes and believes that
the past can be ignored, that the present is what matters, that no
mistakes of the present can be as serious and grievous as the mistakes
of the past. As a result history tends to repeat itself. However, there are
exceptions of nations and men who had learnt from history to avoid
collective and individual disasters or a repetition of such disasters. I feel
confident that Nigeria must join the group of these happy exceptions if
we are to have political stability, economic progress, integrated
development, social justice, contentment and be the epicenter of African
solidarity. Since the end of the civil war, Nigeria has made considerable
progress in all these areas.
